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DECONSTRUCTING THE PSYCHOPATH
A CRITICAL DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS
Cary Federman, Dave Holmes, and Jean Daniel Jacob

She loved accidents: any mention of an animal run over, a man cut to pieces by a
train, was bound to make her rush to the spot.
—Émile Zola, La Bête Humaine (1890)

INTRODUCTION
The spectacle of the wounded body has always had its lurid attractions. Coverage of serial killings and graphic accounts of brutal murders by various media are part of our “spectacular” culture fascinated
by violence and brutality. The television is often the site where private
desire and public fantasy meet, and where the fascination regarding
dangerous offenders is initiated and nurtured (Knox, 17–18; Lesser).
The convening of the public around scenes of violence represents what
Mark Seltzer terms the “wound culture,” a lethal space in which the
public interest in scars and mutilated and opened bodies constitutes
a collective fascination with the unbearable aspects of human life.
Although television news coverage reports violence and atrocities of all kinds, movies are the main medium through which dangerous individuals are presented to the public. The serial killer and
psychopathic representations of unexplained violence can be found
in such Wlms as Friday the 13th, Halloween, Cape Fear, The Silence of the
Lambs, and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (Sharrett; Schmid). The emphasis on the hidden danger of the psychopath has replaced the Western,
with its more clear-cut images of the dangerous individual, as the
most popular genre of Wlm related to the body and to representations
of bodily violence in our culture (Corkin). In effect, current horror
movies, and their associated prequels and sequels, use an efWcient
Cultural Critique 72—Spring 2009—Copyright 2009 Regents of the University of Minnesota
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mixture of gore and frightening scenes of psychopaths preying on the
innocent that help foster the socially constructed subjectivity of the
dangerous individual (Schneider; Hare 1993, 25, 35–36, 85, 140, 178).
In response to (and also in reaction against) the pervasive discourse of the monstrous and of human monsters as caricatures of
madness and danger, the objective of this paper is twofold: Wrst, to
conduct a critical, Foucauldian analysis of the psychopath, based on
a discursive analysis of psychiatric descriptions of psychopathy, and
second, to deconstruct the mythic Wgure of the psychopath and therefore to shed light on the relationship between psychiatric power and
the construction of so-called monsters and psychopaths. Our argument is that the construction of the psychopath, a historically illdeWned concept (Gough; Sutherland 1950b; Cleckley; Hare 1993), as
the main Wgure of modern monstrosity, involves the elaboration of a
technical-knowledge system that is capable of characterizing anyone
who deviates from the norm as dangerous to persons and to society
(Movahedi; Sutherland 1950a; Hare 1993, chapter 7).
To be sure, scientiWc research has been carried out on the dangerous individual in captivity (Verschuere, Crombez, De Clercq, and
Koster; Glueck, 66–70; Hare 1993), thereby linking psychopathy with
biological dangerousness. But few have looked at psychopathy from
a critical and discursive standpoint. That is, in this essay we examine
the way in which the creation of monsters in an earlier age gave way
to the scientiWc inquiry into the character of the dangerous individual in the modern age, creating what Michel Foucault has called a
“system of thought” (Foucault 1994, 5–10). Most studies of psychopathy have viewed it as a medical problem (Harris, Skilling, and Rice;
Black; Siever; Reid; Skodol), a philosophical problem of evil and responsibility (Benn; Ciocchetti; Stein), or as an individual problem, in
some cases, with societal ramiWcations (Hare 1993; Black; Stout; Samenow). But the medical, philosophic, individual, and social studies of
psychopathy have all refrained from characterizing psychopathy as
part of a cultural matrix that heightens the public’s sense of the fear
of criminality, the fear of the unknown, the fear of the unfamiliar, and
the fear of cultural pollution (Hare 1993; Stout; Magid and McKelvey;
Black; Harris, Skilling, and Rice, 200–201). Indeed, the study of psychopathy as a clinical reality remains reliant on two strands of thought
that explicitly reject cultural, historical, philosophic, and linguistic
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analyses: (1) a belief that criminals choose to commit crimes, despite
economic, personal, and psychological factors that may or may not
inXuence their choices; and (2) a belief in scientiWc progress that relies
on continuous conceptual changes regarding what constitutes behavioral abnormalities and a belief that research on the brain can reveal
personality or behavioral disorders, if not now, then in the future (Martens; Salekin, Neumann, Leistico, and Zalot). Split between those
searching for organic causes to explain behavior and those who openly
reject any and all causes of psychopathy, except those that are freely
chosen, descriptions of psychopaths remain burdened by an inability (1) to explain psychopathy using the history and tools of psychoanalysis; (2) to distinguish psychopathy from other behavioral disorders
and syndromes, such as antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), attention deWcit disorder (ADD), bipolar disorder, temporal lobe epilepsy
(TLE), and schizophrenia, to name a few; and (3) by a legacy of catchall descriptions of moral insanity dating from the nineteenth century
(Maudsley, chapter 2; Cohen and CofWn; Hare 1993; Harris, Skilling,
and Rice). To be sure, a few legal scholars, psychologists, psychiatrists,
cultural critics, and social scientists have criticized this approach to
dangerousness and mental illness (Sutherland 1950b; Foucault 1990b).
Aligned with these authors, our analysis is directed at the biopolitical level of the psychiatrization of the monstrous.
Biopolitics rejects a strictly legalistic and positivistic understanding of power over subjects; its gaze is directed at the ever-expanding
control over subjects or populations that exist beyond legal and scientiWc frameworks. Whereas the law “always refers to the sword”
(Foucault 1990a, 144), a biopolitical understanding of subjectivity looks
beyond the spectacle of law’s power and tries to analyze power relations that emanate from “distributions around the norm” (144). In this
understanding, the psychopath does not exist as a mythic Wgure in Wlm,
as a medical entity with a hardwired brain, predisposed toward violence, or as an isolated individual preying on the weak, but as a reality
created by certain discursive contexts based on shifting behavioral
classiWcations that try to meet criminological theories of deviance and
dangerousness. In this view, the only “cure” for the psychopath is the
prison; the only reality of the dangerous individual is the measurement
of his hands, feet, and head, insofar as they deviate from the norm
(Lombroso, chapter 2; Matsuda); by a photograph that demonstrates
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physical abnormalities (Byrnes; Pick); and by the spoken and unspoken word (MacDonald 1911; Estelle v. Smith). The analysis of the psychopath (and of psychopathy) is a case study in biopolitics.
Part of the problem with various studies of psychopathy is that its
most prominent advocates regard its key descriptive elements, a lack
of empathy, guilt, or remorse, and manipulative skill, as consciously
chosen behavioral traits, without regard to the person’s socioeconomic
background (which may hinder clear and concise communication) or
a personal history relating to psychological illnesses (Hare 1993, 126).
And yet it is not clear in what way the classiWcation “psychopath” adds
to our knowledge of the meaning of violence or the origins of deviance.
Robert Hare, for example, Wnds that an infant’s “lack of attachment is
largely the result, not the cause, of psychopathy” (172), but does not
provide any evidence for how a child can become a psychopath on his
or her own. At the opposite end of the spectrum, for those studies that
focus on psychopathy as an organic matter, where one’s penchant for
manipulation or outright violence is brought on by genetic deformities, brain injuries, or hormonal imbalances, there is no critical or
investigative discussion of the social, legal, and historical elements
that constitute the core meaning of psychopathic behavior, as developed by Hare and Hervey Cleckley (Lykken). For the medical community, psychopathy is a stable idea characterizing a stable subject,
and it affects behavior the way tuberculosis or epilepsy does; it is a
treatable disease.
A critical analysis of psychopathy cannot be undertaken without
considering the historical and sociopolitical aspects of the idea of
deviance and violence that have generated the idea of a psychopath
as a psychic entity unmoored from society’s constraints. As a consequence, a critical appraisal of psychopathy needs to take into account
the political and historical development of such a concept (Hacking,
chapter 9). To be sure, Foucauldian analysis casts a skeptical eye toward any idea that tries to prove that concepts (or persons) exist in an
unmediated space, without reference to context, language, and its
social effects. Yet one does not need to rely on Foucault to arrive at the
idea that the medical and psychological understanding of psychopathy itself is an empty vessel, a characterization of behaviors without
stable symptoms, a disease without a cause, and a sociomedical and
linguistic construction that pays its respect to the governing powers
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of the politics of science. As McCord and McCord have written, “for
150 years, science has known of the psychopath’s existence; for at
least 140 years, scientists have quarreled over the deWnition of this disorder” (2; see also Birnbaum; Levy; Lipton; Sutherland 1950b; Werlinder; Wooton).
The key to understanding the psychopath is his behavioral deviation from the norm. The psychopath’s potential for danger is always
offset against the “ordinary criminal” (Cleckley; Hare 1993, 88), whose
aims and motives are clear and understandable to criminologists, psychiatrists, and laymen. The psychopath comes into being, and poses
a juridical and psychological problem, because the psychopath’s
motives, says Hervey Cleckley, are “more obscure” than the common
criminal’s (277)—their crimes are more violent, the psychopath’s response may be colder and more chilling, and the victim may be a
child or some other undeserving person. As Robert Hare writes, “The
callous use of the lonely is a trademark of psychopaths” (Hare 1993,
147). The psychopath, for Hare and Cleckley, chooses to act dangerously, consciously exploiting others’ weaknesses, and takes risks that
no ordinary criminal would. And although neither Cleckley nor Hare
Wnd the psychopath to be suffering from a disease that could affect
judgment or movement, such as autism or epilepsy, they both hold
that the threat of punishment does not discourage psychopaths; the
psychopath’s problems are constitutional, perhaps genetic, but not
environmental (Cleckley, 277; Hare, 1993, chapter 12; Wilson and Herrnstein, chapters 3, 7). More than destroying the peace, the psychopath
shatters our complacency that comes from not knowing that dangerousness cannot be detected by body type or by a psychological interview; psychopathy reveals itself by a sudden eruption of the will that
exists in a hybrid mental state between sanity and madness (but not
insanity or mental illness).
The psychopath, then, can be labeled mentally ill out of a suspicion of organic inWrmities yet to be located (Black; Pincus); can be
morally disordered, deWcient in reasoning or moral understanding,
or simply imprudent; can have “an exaggerated extension of the normal personality” (Fields, 264); or can be not insane or mentally ill at all,
and, therefore, fully culpable (Pinker, 261–62; Hare, 1993, 1996). Being
all things, the psychopath is an invention of gory and frightening narratives that reveal his reality and existence, but only after the event,
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as described by psychiatrists, true-crime authors, and newspaper reports of cold-blooded murders.
The narrative of the crime creates the psychopath and the victim;
it also exposes our danger to strangers and friends alike. A psychopath is born amid the discursive construct of a motiveless murder. In
fact, if the crime in its brutality is without reason, why search for a
cause? The inquiry is directed at the criminal subject, and yet the psychopath remains a scientiWc and historical enigma. Where did he come
from? Why did he do it? It is the “personality structure of the psychopath,” Hare tells us, that “spells trouble for the rest of us” (Hare
1993, 87). But we are not told what the psychopath’s personality
structure is made of, how that structure has developed over time,
what forces have been at work to create that structure, and within
what contexts that structure has emerged. Because the psychopath is
not psychotic, we are not told at what point the psychopath’s personality stopped developing; there is no inquiry into the unconscious.
The psychopath is both the sum total of twenty different psychological states and of any one of its parts (Fields, 261). The psychopath both
is and is not, hence his danger and our foreboding. This understanding of the psychopathic individual as an ahistorical construct, who
exists outside of societal and personal motives and contexts, involves
the psychiatrization of the individual at many levels, but foremost at
the level of the risk he poses to his fellow citizens (Janus; Rose).
The study of dangerousness in the psychiatric and criminological
domains has gained more attention in the last thirty years (Dorland
and Krauss; Vidal and Skeem; Monahan). The technical-knowledge
system developed with regard to dangerousness often (if not always)
refers to the intrinsically dangerous personality, a designation that
ascribes future dangerousness to a calculus of probability: the social
calculation of risk and the calculable accident (Castel; Ewald). The
study of dangerousness, then, and the associated calculation of risk,
is clearly aligned with the elaboration of a social prophylaxis by which
the dangerous individual may be named, then tamed, by statistical
regularities and so-called “risk management” (Osborne). According
to Seltzer, the question that arises from the increased emphasis on
dangerousness and risk is whether this way of understanding persons and behaviors, from the outside, “is not also a way for accounting for them from within” (30). Given a dead body and bloody weapon,
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determining a previously thought-out motive is not a necessity; dangerousness is determined by the act itself.
Elissa Ely, a medical doctor who writes for the New York Times,
relates the following story of a man, a recently released inmate incarcerated for “mayhem,” who is at a clinic for a follow-up psychiatric
evaluation, but the clinic does not know what to do with him, as he
shows no signs of danger or illness. Dr. Ely spoke with someone at the
clinic to Wnd out how he was doing.
The prison psychiatrist had described the patient as unrepentant, explosive, satisWed with his crime and “extremely physically Wt.” According to
the prison record, his conviction was for assault and battery with intent
to kill; he had attacked his ex-wife with a machete.
. . . Most of all, he needed money, he said, and if we couldn’t arrange
emergency Wnancing, he planned to get it by any means possible.
. . . Do you know how you would get [some money]?
He shrugged.
You would hurt someone?
He nodded.
We had no authority to send him back to prison. We could only
send him to a psychiatric emergency room. This was not the right place
for him. He did not have a mental illness. He was . . . not hallucinating
or suicidal.
Fearing that he posed a threat to society, the clinic called an ambulance and sent him to a hospital, restrained in a gurney. Ely called someone at the hospital to alert him of his arrival.
. . . No one wants a man like this, without psychosis or clear-cut violent behavior, in an emergency room. It means a long night and a large
headache. The voice was skeptical. “Doesn’t sound hospitalizable,” it
said. I argued, though I would have said the same thing if I had been in
that position. Early the next morning, I called back. A different weary
voice answered. “We sent him home,” the voice said. “But he doesn’t
have a home,” I said. The voice said: “There was no psychiatric illness.
We gave him a cab voucher, and he left on his own. He said he’d follow
up with you.” (Ely)

The above story demonstrates the difWculty psychiatrists have in determining whether one violent act leads to another, and whether dangerousness is always mental illness. The subject of the story, half criminal,
half patient, demonstrated his “psychopathic” behavior by his machete
attack against his ex-wife and by showing no clear signs of mental illness. Because the psychopath exists “beyond our normal deWnition of
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insanity” (Norris, 214), he is always already dangerous, and dangerousness “is a characteristic the alleged mental patient shares with the
criminal, rather than with the medically ill person” (Szasz, 46). Indeed,
it is this empty space, between nonestablished mental illness and the
necessity of preserving free will and responsibility, so that choice implicates the criminal not the society at large, that the psychopath
occupies, until studies can prove that the psychopath’s coldness and
lack of affect are the result not of choice but of imbalances within a
person’s “neuroanatomical structures and monoamine oxidase-type
A (MAO) neurotransmitters” (Harris, Skilling, and Rice, 198; Lykken,
chapter 12; Goleman 1987), which, would, presumably, obviate the
psychopath’s guilt (Norris, chapter 13; Tancredi).
Despite the scientiWc murkiness of the word psychopath as a description of a manipulative, unremorseful, and sometimes violent individual, part of the attraction of the term is its expansiveness, its ability
to include burglars, white-collar criminals, and serial killers (Hare
1993, chapter 7). The idea of a willful murderer (or a willful manipulator) without mental illness creates a space for the legal and social
construction of personal responsibility to overtake an undeWned, misunderstood, and reprehensible action that cannot be deWned by science
or articulated by the subject. The silence of the accused psychopath,
when asked to explain his behavior, is translated as a lack of remorse
and a sign of willed guilt. “Guilt?” says convicted serial killer Ted
Bundy. “It’s the mechanism we use to control people. It’s an illusion.
It’s a kind of social control mechanism—and it’s very unhealthy” (Michaud and Aynesworth, 288, italics in original). For Hare (1993, 41), however, Bundy’s Nietzschean bravado against what he sees as a social
construct used as a mechanism of control merits not an investigation
into Bundy’s understanding of guilt, morality, remorse, and criminal
responsibility, but a conclusion about a psychopath’s chosen inability
to feel remorse or any kind of emotion. Bundy’s criticism of societal
mores as unhealthy “assumes the mystique of meaningless” (Tithecott
166), creating a nihilistic picture of his behavior and providing a motive
for his murders.
Operating on the assumptions that the serial killer is free of mental disease and acts on his own, serial killers provide much fodder for
psychopathic studies. They are textbook examples of the “Psychopathic Checklist,” Wrst established by Cleckley and expanded upon by

43

02 Federman, Holmes, Jacob.qxd

44

6/10/2009

3:46 PM

Page 44

CARY FEDERMAN, DAVE HOLMES, AND JEAN DANIEL JACOB

Hare. Serial killers are linguistically manipulative, social misWts, cold,
without affect, and operate without motive. Few have been found
mentally ill or insane (Schecter). The assumption is that serial killers
choose to kill, manipulate, and destroy; that they are sick, diseased,
even, but not psychotic. For E. Michael McCann, the prosecutor in the
Jeffrey Dahmer trial, Dahmer “was in control at all times and could
have chosen not to kill” (New York Times, 1992a, 23). McCann rejected
the defense’s attempt to make necrophilia a personality disorder that
negates free will or criminal responsibility. Dahmer’s use of condoms
while having sex with dead bodies provided proof of his rationality
and sanity. The jury found Dahmer not insane, and guilty of Wfteen
murders (Johnson, 1).
The problem with connecting serial killers to psychopathy is that
the serial killer’s personality proWle Wts whatever checklists exist that
describe deviant behavior. A serial killer’s actions are so far removed
from ordinary criminal behavior, mixing cleverness and duplicity with
cannibalism and necrophilia, that explanations can only exist at the
periphery of human understanding. But rather than making a perfect
Wt with psychopathy, the serial killer is very much an empty vessel, a
socially constructed monster of modern times. The serial killer, for
example, is often thought of as a loner, and therefore as always potentially dangerous, when what is really occurring, particularly in the
media’s descriptions of a serial killer’s biography, is the empowering
of the lonely by turning them into loners (Tithecott, 113). Similarly,
serial killers are often characterized as silent, rarely supplying motives
or explanations for their behavior. While it is possible that their silence
is a sign of their unXappable natures, biologically derived, it is more
interesting to note that their silence is more often explained as a sign
of their psychopathological behavior, freely chosen (New York Times,
1992b, A16; Goleman 1993, B6).
In a celebrated Supreme Court case, for example, a noted psychiatrist, who was also an advocate of connecting violent criminality
with diagnoses of future dangerousness, determined that a convicted
killer was a psychopath because of his silence, which he understood
as a lack of remorse.
Dr. James Grigson testiWed before the jury on direct examination: (a) that
Smith “is a very severe sociopath”; (b) that “he will continue his previous behavior”; (c) that his sociopathic condition will “only get worse”;
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(d) that he has no “regard for another human being’s property or for their
life, regardless of who it may be”; (e) that “[t]here is no treatment, no
medicine . . . that in any way at all modiWes or changes this behavior”;
(f) that he “is going to go ahead and commit other similar or same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so”; and (g) that he “has no
remorse or sorrow for what he has done.” (Estelle v. Smith 459–60)

For Dr. Grigson, the key to his diagnosis of Smith’s lack of remorse
was less what Smith said or did than his silence.
I think that his telling me this story and not saying, you know, “Man, I
would do anything to have that man back alive. I wish I hadn’t just
stepped over the body.” Or you know, “I wish I had checked to see if he
was all right” would indicate a concern, guilt, or remorse. But I didn’t
get any of this. (464)

The subject’s silence regarding his deed reinforces the idea that the
person is sick but only morally so—sick enough to commit a horrendous act, but not so sick as to be declared irresponsible and not guilty
(C. MacDonald). Silence speaks, because it hides the psychopath’s dangerousness (Parker, 86).
For Michel Foucault, the focus on dangerousness as a historical
construction of various classiWcatory schemes, derived from psychiatry, has its roots in late nineteenth-century thought. By the end of the
nineteenth century, Foucault writes, the concept of the dangerous
individual involved a shift in focus from the criminal act to the character of the actor, permitting layman and specialists to see the signs
of danger and illness everywhere (Foucault 1990b; Jastrow).

HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF PSYCHOPATHY
Before the dangerous individual came into existence, the Wgure of the
monster haunted Western thought (Shildrick). According to Foucault
(2003, chapter 4), the birth of the monster belongs to the biolegal
domain because the monster combines the unnatural, the socially forbidden, and the legally prohibited. The monster is an exceptional personage, a “freakish hybridity” (Cohen 1999, 130) that has transgressed
both the natural and the positive laws. In effect, monstrosity appears
when the law of nature is perverted and the perception of this perversion is taken to be a threat to social stability. As Kai Erikson has
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written, deviants “supply needed services to society by marking the
outer limits of group experience and providing a point of contrast
which gives the norm some scope and dimension” (1966, 27). Each historical period has its own sort of monsters. Today, the serial killer
(especially when rape is coupled with murder, or the murders are especially gruesome, as in the cases of Jeffrey Dahmer, Ed Gein, Ed Kemper, and Ted Bundy, all of whom mutilated their victims; or, as in the
cases of Dahmer and John Wayne Gacy, the victims were young boys)
accounts for the monster of our time (Tithecott; Norris; Jenkins). The
psychopath, living outside the boundaries of psychiatric classiWcations
of mental illness, may be seen as a species in the gallery of monsters.
Psychopathy is the heir to the nineteenth century’s theory of
“moral insanity,” the idea that the violent or the dangerous demonstrate no signs of illness or of danger. The term “psychopath” Wlls in
the space left open by the inability of late nineteenth-century alienists
and neurologists to locate the seat and trajectory of mental disease
and violence in the brain, and moral philosophy’s ethical stance regarding the importance of willed behavior (James, chapter 10; Valverde).
In A Treatise on Insanity, written in 1837, the alienist James Cowles
Prichard described moral insanity as existing in “an apparently unimpaired state of the intellectual faculties” (1973, 20). As Philippe Pinel,
considered the father of modern psychiatry, noted, “there were many
maniacs who betrayed no lesion whatever of the understanding, but
were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the
affective faculties alone had sustained injury” (Balfour Browne, 275;
Prichard, chapter 2).
Over the course of psychiatry’s history, there have been numerous “catch-all” phrases that have tried to account for behavior that
could not be physically located in the brain (Bentall, chapter 3). Lacking the ability to obtain what the historian of science Charles Rosenberg calls “veriWable knowledge” (Rosenberg 1997, 32) of insanity’s
etiology, eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century alienists spoke of
“moral insanity” as a “condition ‘without any remarkable disorder or
defect of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination’” (Werlinder, 21).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Benjamin Rush, the founder
of American psychiatry, used the word “anomia” for the total absence
of a moral faculty, and spoke of “diseases in the moral faculty” and
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“moral derangement” (Rush 1805, 23; Rush 1835, chapter 19), both of
which he attached to aberrant behavior that lacked organic speciWcity.
Consequently, the idea of a psychopathic monster has often been
associated with inexplicable or motiveless crimes, usually involving
the murder of close relatives or children (Bromberg; Foucault 1975;
Werlinder). The inability among nineteenth-century alienists and neurologists to locate deviant behavior within the body (or in the brain,
in particular) led to the idea that psychopaths willingly act contrary
to societal norms, and gave rise to the construction of personal responsibility as a space that is free from environmental and hereditarian inXuences (Mercier).
Despite its lack of success in locating the source of violence and
of aberrant behavior, the psychiatric profession continued its search
for psychopathy’s location. For Pinel in France, asymptomatic mental
illness, which was manifested in illusions, odd and unexplainable
behavior, and crime, was known as manie sans délire, which Pinel’s
student, Jean-Étienne Esquirol, deWned as an “intellect [that] is more
or less injured” while the body remains healthy (Werlinder, 32). For
Esquirol, there were madmen who did not experience hallucinations,
but “there are none in whom the passions and moral affections are
not disordered, perverted, or destroyed” (Prichard, 23; Esquirol, 199–
232). Monomania, then, is a disease of the will, in which the subject
labors under some particular illusion about reality (for Esquirol, the
disease is located in the brain, even if that was not yet provable), and
was therefore also called “partial insanity,” but also known by its various subdivisions that implicate deviant and dangerous behavior, such
as an obsessive focus on sex and on Wre, or willingly committing harm
against others (monomanie érotique, monomanie d’ivresse, monomanie incendiaire, monomanie homicide, monomanie raisonnante) (Werlinder, 33–34).
At the end of the nineteenth century, most alienists no longer
found moral insanity to be a valid scientiWc concept (Rosenberg 1989;
Fink, chapter 3), and it was replaced by the term psychopathic inferiority (Bromberg, 62–63). Motivated by this new spirit of biological and
neurological inquiry, Edward Spitzka, in Insanity: Its ClassiWcation,
Diagnosis, and Treatment, deWned insanity purely in physical terms,
writing that “insanity is a term applied to certain results of brain disease and brain defect which invalidate mental integrity” (1973, 17;
1907). As a sign of his turn-of-the-century progressiveness, Spitzka’s
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book has no chapter on or discussion of moral insanity, but he does
discuss the role of the retina, the blood, urine, temperature, the intestinal tract, and the skin in insanity (1973, 66–72).
The inability of the psychiatric profession to locate psychopathy
within the brain did not lead it to abandon its research into the etiology of the disease. Rather, it intensiWed its efforts, increasing the forms
of behavior classiWed as psychopathic, and relating the behavior to speciWc medical ailments already known. Thus, Hervey Cleckley, the modern founder of psychopathic studies, writes, in The Mask of Sanity, that
by the middle of the twentieth century, the psychopathic personality
can be linked with “psychopathic sexuality,” whose manifestations
are: “homosexuality, erotomania, sexual perversion, sexual immaturity.” “Pathologic emotionality” is manifested in the “schizoid personality, cyclothymic personality, paranoid personality,” and is associated
with “emotional instability.” Amoral or asocial psychopathy is associated with “antisociality, pathologic mendacity, moral deWciency, vagabondage, misanthropy” (Cleckley, 251; see also Krafft-Ebing, 53–77,
223–30).
By the middle of the twentieth century, the term psychopath had
become popularly synonymous with evil itself, “representing depths
of abhorrence and symbolizing the dark side of the human psyche”
(Mason and Mercer, 53; Rosenbaum). According to Robert Hare, who
provides a detailed deWnition of psychopathy, psychopaths are:
Social predators who charm, manipulate, and ruthlessly plow their way
through life, leaving a broad trail of broken hearts, shattered expectations, and empty wallets. Completely lacking in conscience and in feelings for others, they selWshly take what they want and do as they please,
violating social norms and expectations without the slightest sense of
guilt or regret. (1993, xi)

Regardless of the century, the psychopath represents the Wgure of a
cold and ruthless killer, acting without remorse and overt signs of
mental illness, and preying on vulnerable individuals. He or she (the
psychopath is almost always male, see Blair, Mitchell, and Blair) is
driven by immediate personal gratiWcation and acts without compassion and without conscience. Unlike those labeled mentally ill, who
can negate the mens rea requirement in all criminal cases by proving
their illness caused the crime (Caplan), psychopaths often maintain
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responsibility for their behavior: they are their behavior (Michaud and
Aynesworth). The assertion of pure legal responsibility and a “diagnosis” of psychopathy begs the question of why psychopaths should
fall within the psychiatric domain. Psychopathy, in the words of John
Gunn, remains “an elusive concept with moral overtones” (Gunn, 32).
The prominent work of Hare, for example, has shown that psychopathic traits are distributed among the so-called “normal population.” Hare classiWes the following behaviors as psychopathic: “glib
and superWcial charm; egocentricity; selWshness; lack of empathy, guilt,
and remorse; deceitfulness and manipulativeness; lack of enduring
attachments to people, principles or goals; impulsive and irresponsible behavior; and a tendency to violate explicit social norms” (1980,
118). For Hare, however, psychopaths are not sociopaths because sociopaths are “forged entirely by social forces,” and Hare can Wnd “no
convincing evidence that psychopathy is the direct result of early social
or environmental factors” (1993, 23, 170). A focus on heredity or the
environment would, presumably, implicate society in the etiology of
a psychopath (Black 106). A psychopath freely chooses to break the
law, according to Hare, with minimal outside and internal factors contributing to the psychopath’s behavior.
For Hare, a psychopath is also not a person suffering from antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), though the symptoms are virtually identical. Antisocial personality disorder is a term “reserved for
individuals who are basically unsocialized and whose behavior pattern brings them repeatedly into conXict with society” (Black, 24).
Psychopathy, on the other hand, “is deWned by a cluster of both personality traits and socially deviant behaviors” (Hare 1993, 24). Hare,
then, admits that society has an inXuence on psychopaths, particularly insofar as “society is moving in the direction of permitting, reinforcing, and in some instances actually valuing some of the traits
listed in the Psychopathy Checklist” (177), but rejects the idea that society is implicated in the creation of psychopaths. Indeed, Hare shares
with Donald Black the idea that diagnoses of antisocial personality
disorder and psychopathy could be confused with a general lament
about the decline of values within North American culture (Black, 6–7;
Hare 1993, 177). That this cocktail of behaviors exists without preconditions or contexts, with unknown organic and environmental causes,
subtracts more than adds to scientiWc knowledge. Without a diseased
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brain, the psychopath is a legal entity more than a clinical one, a physical danger to society more than a medical problem in need of attention. And yet, despite its deWnitional ambiguity, the term remains in
vogue in the psychiatric domain (Reid; Blair, Mitchell, and Blair). In
light of the multiple symptoms and overlap with other diseases and
disorders, psychopathy lends itself to professional libertarianism,
under which the psychopath is not a single (and differentiated) clinical disorder but a convenient label (Richman; Hacking).
In 1975, for example, in the United Kingdom, the Butler Report
noted that the etiology, symptoms, and treatment of psychopathy are
“only to be understood as reference to the particular sense in which
the term is employed by the psychiatrists in question” (123). More
than thirty years later, we are facing the same gap. The poor conceptual deWnition of psychopathy leaves room for interpretations of behavior based more on fears of “amorphous moral decay” (Black, 7)
than on scientiWc data that proves psychopathy is a mental disorder,
and, as a consequence, it is open to abuses and misuses in the psychiatric domain. Other “on-the-spot constructed diagnoses,” such as
“anger management syndrome,” not even listed in the DSM-IV, expose
psychiatry and psychology to well-deserved criticisms when substantive conceptual work is simply not undertaken (Lane). In this regard,
with an acknowledgment of psychopathy’s limitations, the conceptual deWnition of psychopathy ought to be clearly deWned before any
attempt to measure a person’s potential dangerousness is undertaken.
The rhetoric of psychopathy is a component of the powerful psychiatric apparatus, which is a closed system of interpretation, wider
than the “clinical,” but based on the assumption and the premise that
the psychopath indeed exists as a different entity in the personality
disorder realm. In 1994, Blackburn stated that the literature on the
subject is compounded by several contradictions: Wrst, the term psychopath is used inconsistently, where it refers to personality disorders
in general, a persistently socially deviant individual, or a narrow, more
speciWc class of offenders characterized by a lack of guilt and empathy, impulsivity and intolerance of frustration; second, there is the
vagueness and ambiguity concerning the link between treatment and
outcomes. As stated by Blackburn, “psychodynamic programmes, for
example, tend to identify vague goals, such as improved social responsibility, self-awareness, or self-control, but provide no realistic means
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of determining their attainment” (383). Moreover, recent research results (though few controlled studies) also show that although milieu
therapy has been recommended as the treatment of choice, psychopaths have a higher rate of general and violent recidivism than do
nonpsychopaths (Hemphill; Rice, Harris, and Cormier; Hare 1993, 198;
1998, 201–2).
The fact is that the deWnition of psychopathy remains unclear because it is simultaneously associated with dangerousness, evil, and
illness, as if these three concepts are conceptually indistinguishable
(Stein; Rezneck). Rhetoric is indebted to metaphors to create shared
technical-knowledge and meanings, to instruct the senses to focus in
a given direction and to condense psychological complexities into legal
shorthand that is easily understood by laymen. Historical investigations, however, show how the construct referred to as “psychopathy”
has emerged and also how its deWnition remains Xawed and its treatment ineffective (Hare 1993, chapter 12). If the psychopath is evil or
pure dangerousness, could the psychopath be treated by psychiatry,
in the absence of physiological or psychological symptoms of mental
illness? If not, then is the psychopath a cousin of the monster and of
the dangerous individual (Foucault 1990b; Shildrick)?
In the medical realm, as in the legal, there is no consensus as to
whether or not mentally disordered persons are especially prone to
violence and dangerousness (Warren; Failer; Arrigo; Stone; Elliott; Coid
and Cordess). Indeed, the difWculty regarding the study of psychopathy is that both lawyers and psychologists have trouble deWning
and delimiting its two core features: (1) whether or not psychopaths
are mentally ill, or suffer from chemical imbalances or brain impairments; and (2) whether or not psychopaths are dangerous. Hare Wnds
psychopaths not to be “mad” (1993, 5), but it is signiWcant that he
does not use the more modern and scientiWc designations, insanity or
mental illness. Psychopathy results “not from a deranged mind but
from a cold, calculating rationality combined with a chilling inability
to treat others as thinking, feeling human beings” (5). The behavior of
psychopaths, he writes, “is the result of choice, freely exercised” (22,
italics in original). As such, and because psychopaths exist beyond the
boundaries of psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis, they need
to be constrained by law (Gaylin, chapter 9). From a legal standpoint,
however, the courts are prevented from restraining psychopaths before
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they act because courts need a guilty act to punish, not a hunch that
a guilty act may occur, based on prior behavior, diagnoses of dangerousness, or the classiWcatory schemes of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders. Not surprisingly, legal decisions on dangerousness and civil commitments have ranged from overinclusiveness
to underinclusiveness, in part, in an effort to balance the protection
of society and the procedural rights of those deemed mentally ill, but
equally so because of a lack of hard evidence as to dangerousness’s
predictability (Pratt; Arrigo, 86–90; Failer; Barefoot v. Estelle 1983, 920;
O’Connor v. Donaldson; Aldige Hiday). In many ways, then, the regard
for the psychopath’s individual choice has it roots in the history and
development of the psychiatric profession’s concern for law and order.

THE PSYCHIATRIC EMPIRE
Historically, medicine did not forge an alliance with madness out of
a need for care, but did so in the urgency of terror. Physicians and
other health care professionals were not asked to treat individuals,
but to protect others (Earle; Foucault 2005; Spitzka 1973; Rothman).
By the mid-seventeenth century, we witness the foundation in France
of l’Hôpital Général de Paris, an agency of the bourgeois and monarchical orders, designed and designated to isolate individuals whose
behavior was qualiWed as dangerous or disturbing in regard to the
social order and morality (Russ; Geller and Harris).
Since at least the eighteenth century, Wgures of insanity (vagabonds, libertines, the mad, for example) projected the image of fear
and of an imminent threat to society (Gilman). From the concrete to the
Wctitious, madness slowly forged an image of darkness and monstrosity in the social conscience of Western nations (Goldberg). Madness
was a subject of fascination for the public and the private domains,
where its understanding continued to lie in esoteric knowledge. Goya,
for example, says that the origins of monsters lay in the sleep of reason (Beaujour). The hidden but always already present monstrosity of
man’s nature reXected his animal roots, mixing environmentalism with
hereditarianism and history with nature, thereby demonstrating madness’s presence at the intersection between man and creature (Davidson; Browne; Foucault 2005; Stevenson; Stoker; Shelley).
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ConWnement was the social process that rendered possible the immediate exclusion of these individuals and brought about the moment
where madness could be identiWed as a social burden (Foucault,
2005). Consequently, conWnement became the institution of a universal morality, where a regime of social control mimicking the family
structure was in place to act as the voice of reason and social order
(Ignatieff; Rothman; Donzelot). Although conWnement was essentially
instigated to protect society from all forms of social deviance, this
site of exclusion, which will be formally known as the asylum, slowly
became the natural space of madness (Foucault 2005; Jodelet; Porter;
Scull; Scull, MacKenzie, and Hervey). What the classical age of reason (the period from Descartes to Kant) had recognized as a space of
exclusion and correction had, by the nineteenth century, exchanged
its language of punishment for a discourse of scientiWc truth, where
the question of individual liberty and the need for personal restriction dictated the mechanisms of both cure and conformity. Madness
by Kant’s time is deWned by the illusionary liberty that was created
inside the asylum or prison (Foucault 2005; David-Menard; Meranze).
If the medical professional was able to deWne madness according
to a personal history, the patient’s physiognomy, and rudimentary
scientiWc inquiry into the patient’s family background, it was only because of the medical professional’s ability to control the behavior at
issue, not to cure it. What the positivistic view of individual behavior
could objectively identify in the psychiatric practice was the result of its
domination over individuals (Foucault 2005; Hahn Rafter, chapter 3).
Medicine was capable of differentiating madness from sanity by generating classiWcation schemes that labeled any and all kinds of behavior
sane or insane, based on the currently available level of scientiWc research. David Rothman notes, for example, that in nineteenth-century
America, “religious anxiety,” “fear of poverty,” “masturbation,” “political excitement,” and “disappointed ambition” all were considered to
be forms of insanity that could require incarceration (111).
In the relationship between the observed (deWned as mad or dangerous, or both) and the observer (the medical practitioner) as the
Wgure of normality to which one can be compared, madness was considered as other (that is, as an exception to the norm), a point of reference that led all too easily to conWnement (Foucault 2005). It was
between these walls of exclusion that medicine attempted to name,
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label, and classify madness (Goldstein; Goldberg; Fink), creating a
space for the medicalization of dangerousness that could focus less on
visible signs of danger and abnormality and more on behavior itself
as the deWnition of the dangerous individual. Yet a distinct obstacle
rendered the task of this nosographic plan extremely difWcult. Where
madness intersects with the average man, there is the inevitable presence of moral judgment that only sheds light on the ill-deWned lines
separating the normal and the pathological individual (Canguilhem;
Foucault 2005; Maudsley, 30). If, at its roots, medicine was unable to differentiate illness from forms of social deviance (vagabonds, libertines,
and criminals) that transgressed social norms, it was necessary to make
certain that abnormal behavior could be named and qualiWed as pathologic because of the existence of certain symptoms deemed sufWciently
nonenvironmental as to be willed. By the end of the nineteenth century, a constant search by psychiatrists for new and innovative ways
to liberate society of deviant and marginal populations enabled the
production of speciWc technologies to attain this end (Curra).
To be sure, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) makes clear that “neither deviant behaviour (e.g., political,
religious, or sexual) nor conXicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conXict
is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual” (xxi). But this is a
declaration, not an examination of actually existing conditions. Indeed,
throughout the nineteenth century, it was this method of naming
and classifying madness based on behavior that led to the progressive
expansion of psychiatry outside the asylum in the twentieth century,
where its application could target any individual (Castel, Castel and
Lovell, chapter 4; Torrey). The political project of madness opened up
new frontiers of control and the normalization of individuals. The
subsequent transformation within industrialized societies rendered
members of society not usually considered mad as targets of disciplinary technologies (Castel, Castel, and Lovell; S. Cohen; Lyon).
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Gregor Mendel’s
breakthrough in regard to heredity only perpetuated the idea of mental illness as an incurable disease, thus creating a new meaning for
psychic deWciency (Waller). In light of this discovery, social concerns
arose pertaining to the offspring of deviants and controlling their
reproduction in society (Buck v. Bell; Smith). This new breed of the
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feeble-minded suddenly became the target of a vast number of tactical enterprises that would project this issue at a national level (Perron,
Fluet, and Holmes; Trent). The threat of these feeble-minded individuals became part of a collective fear:
The feeble-minded form a class of parasites incapable of sustaining their
own needs and are unable to take care of their own business. They cause
an unbelievable amount of burden in their own homes and constitute
a threat of danger for the community. The women are almost always
immoral, often transmit venereal diseases and give birth to children as
dull as they are . . . all feeble-minded, and mostly idiots, are potential
criminals that are only waiting for the occasion to give in to their criminal tendencies. (Castel, Castel, and Lovell, 63; authors’ translation)

This conception of mental illness as weakness and as a social, legal,
and hygienic form of dangerousness led to the eugenic interventions
that envisioned a social castration of mental illness, which cordoned
off the mentally ill and feeble-minded from civil society itself, making them vulnerable to scientiWc experimentation (Kühl; Pick; Trent;
Haller).
The ascendancy of the psychiatric apparatus outside the walls of
the asylum and into the capillaries of society conceptualized prevention and detection as key elements of its mandate. It is this enlargement
of psychiatry’s nosographic classes and its institutional apparatus that
rendered possible the expansion of psychiatric and legal interventions.
The objective of this expansion was not so much to treat mental illness
but to contain it within its sphere. This movement was supported by
a curative and preventive notion regarding the identiWcation and
extermination of pathogenic agents found on the periphery of civil
society (Castel, Castel, and Lovell, chapter 5; Boyer, chapter 15).
The mental hygiene movement bypassed the asylum by insisting
on the need to educate the public and expose knowledge on all forms
of psychic disorders. This movement, which inWltrated the social realm,
replaced the older notion of psychiatry and its repressive institutions
with a less-than-subtle intrusion into the core of all social life. The
contemporary psychiatric system is clearly rooted in this logic, for it extends far beyond the medicalized institution (psychiatric institutions,
for instance). It comprises widespread but loosely related assemblages
of institutions, discourses, and practices that seek to regulate individual subjectivities before they become uncontrollable (that is, before

55

02 Federman, Holmes, Jacob.qxd

56

6/10/2009

3:46 PM

Page 56

CARY FEDERMAN, DAVE HOLMES, AND JEAN DANIEL JACOB

sickness becomes dangerousness). Modern psychiatry’s imperative is
to intervene before health is damaged, to construct an “at-risk” individual, and to manage personal and social relations in the name of
mental disorder and the promotion of mental health. The progression
from mental illness to mental health has shifted civic ideals based on
liberty and personal responsibility toward control and preemption,
and permitted the manipulation of values that would facilitate the
differentiation between the normal and the pathological.
In this preventive psychiatric endeavor, evaluations of madness
in society take on a new form. Moving away from the individual subject, mid-twentieth-century psychiatric evaluations focused on the
identiWcation of risk factors in groups of dangerous, mentally ill
offenders. As described in the psychiatrization of children, it is not
their problems that were the sole component of scrutiny, but their families, their schools, their social environments, and all factors that could
contribute to their inability to function (Donzelot; Freedman). In addition, the focal point of psychiatric evaluation moved away from the
act of deviance itself (without formally abandoning that narrative) to
the interpretation of the evil intention. Motive, previously banished,
reappears, as it can now be inferred from the psychopath’s level of
remorse (Estelle v. Smith). In this complex analysis, a differentiation
between the act of reasoning (or lack of) and the action itself leads to
the scientiWcally more accurate identiWcation of bad or mad individuals (Foucault 2005). This large-scale diffusion of psychiatric interventions within society also merged alliances with other control systems,
in particular, the justice system (Dowbiggin; Sutherland 1950a; Failer).
This alliance between the legal and the medical professions drew new
lines between the repressive institution (the prison), the judicial sanction, and the notion of treatment. Psychiatry is now fully engaged
in the medicalization of law, and the delineation of a new language
that deWned the dangerous individual and one of its subspecies: the
psychopath.

CONCLUSION
Our historical and discursive approach to the problem of the psychopath represents the philosophical rejection of essentialism and absolutism, which were prevalent in regard to psychiatric concepts and
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knowledge production during the Wrst half of the twentieth century.
This worldview (or paradigm), known as post-positivism, is still
largely in vogue in the scientiWc domain, where epistemological debates are almost nonexistent and where some discourses are considered “truths,” despite a lack of evidence (Holmes et al.; Murray et al.;
Davidson, chapter 5). From a critical standpoint, concepts are considered to change, grow, and develop in an evolutionary manner to
enhance, maintain, clarify, and utilize speciWc disciplines, such as medicine and nursing. This skeptical and historically sensitive approach
helps us to understand the sequence “monster–dangerous individual–
psychopath.”
Despite its lack of scientiWc certitude, and its reliance on criminology and cultural critiques of contemporary North American society,
psychopathy is embedded in the collective (that is, popular) memory
of modern Western thought. But because the scientiWc community cannot discern the psychopath’s illness, they motive-hunt for a “motiveless malignity” (West 1978, 29). Psychopathy will continue to refer to
the most extreme form of association between mental disorder and
criminal behavior, but without any scientiWc basis for that judgment.
The psychopath will remain one uniWed entity in the biopolitical, sociocultural domain, his image reinforced through various media, such as
horror movies. But it would be better for everyone if the word showed
up more often in Hollywood and less in the halls of science.

Note
D. Holmes and J. D. Jacob would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding.
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